by Nicolas Hulscher, MPH
In November 2024, our paper titled, Proximal Origin of Epidemic Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b and Spread by Migratory Waterfowl, was published after successful peer-review in the journal Poultry, Fisheries & Wildlife Sciences:
Please enjoy my interview with Mike Vera on the Healthy & Awake Podcast, where I provide a comprehensive overview and exact details regarding our serious suspicion of an H5N1 bird flu lab leak from the USDA Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory (SEPRL), leading to the current outbreaks.
Notably, the USDA or any other government agency has neither officially denied nor refuted this possibility. However, certain high-profile individuals that may be serving as USDA operatives have attempted to ‘debunk’ our study. So far, all of these defamation attempts fail to mention or intentionally omit ALL of the key findings supporting our conclusions, raising serious concerns about potential nefarious motives. If you’re interested in learning about the key individuals conducting dangerous bioterrorist-like gain-of-function experiments, check out the following article:
State-sponsored bioterrorism, including gain-of-function experiments designed to make pathogens more transmissible and deadly in humans, should not be rewarded with a good reputation. This type of reckless 'research' should be immediately outlawed to protect the world from another man-made pandemic resulting in mass casualties. It’s important to understand that lab leaks are more common than one may expect. Since 2001, there have been ~300 confirmed biolab pathogen leaks globally, with the vast majority (78.6%) occurring in the United States:
There have been multiple confirmed lab ‘accidents’ involving laboratory-modified H5N1 bird flu, as outlined in our paper:
In January 2014, the CDC experienced an inadvertent cross-contamination incident where a low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A (H9N2) virus culture was contaminated with a HPAI A (H5N1) virus [42]. This contaminated culture was subsequently shipped to the SEPRL in Athens, Georgia, but the issue wasn't identified until May 2014, meaning that unrecognized H5N1 contamination could have been occurred for months. The contamination event revealed gaps in laboratory safety protocols and reporting mechanisms, underscoring the risk of H5N1 escape even within high-containment facilities such as SEPRL. Moreover, in 2012, Kawaoka et al, using GOF techniques, modified H5N1 in the laboratory to better infect ferrets at the University of Wisconsin-Madison by introducing four specific mutations in the viral haemagglutinin (HA) protein within a 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus backbone [43]. These modifications allowed the H5N1 virus to preferentially recognize human-type receptors, replicate efficiently in ferrets, and transmit via respiratory droplets, while causing lung lesions and weight loss without high pathogenicity or mortality.
In November 2013, a researcher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison accidentally pierced their finger with a needle containing this engineered H5N1 virus [44]. The injured researcher was quarantined at home rather than in a specialized facility, raising concerns about the university's preparedness for such incidents. In December 2019, another breach occurred at the same university when a trainee's respirator hose detached during an experiment with a lab-engineered H5N1 virus. The university delayed notifying health officials and federal oversight bodies, raising concerns about inadequate safety measures and reporting practices [44].
These incidents underscore critical lapses in laboratory safety and oversight that can occur at BSL-3 laboratories such as the SEPRL and the Erasmus Medical Center, highlighting the significant risks associated with GOF research. Merler et al estimated that there’s a 5% to 15% chance that an H5N1 lab escape would not be detected at all using model simulations of a lab leak originating in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, the same city were Fouchier and colleagues conducted GOF experiments (Figure 3) [45]. The authors conclude the study by indicating that controlling escape incidents, potentially by mallard ducks or other migratory waterfowl, is not always possible, particularly in highly populated areas. With the rapid proliferation of biosafety laboratories globally, this represents a significant threat to public health.
Ultimately, the origin of H5N1 bird flu should be the subject of a criminal investigation:
Nicolas Hulscher, MPH
Epidemiologist and Foundation Administrator, McCullough Foundation
www.mcculloughfnd.org
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